January 6, 1995
U.S. Department of Energy
c/o Argonne National Laboratory, EAD
Building 900, Mail Stop 1
9700 South Cass Avenue
Argonne, IL 60439
Dear Sir or Madam:
The High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee (HLW) of the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) is pleased to submit the enclosed comments on the Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Fabrication and Deployment of a Multi-Purpose Canister-Based System for the Management of Civilian Spent Nuclear Fuel.
The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) proposed decision for fabrication and deployment of the MPC is a major agency action. The comments provided with this letter are intended to provide an overview of WIEB's HLW Committee's concerns with respect to the proposed Multi-Purpose Canister-Based system.
Sincerely,
Daniel Nix, Co-Chair
High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee
Joe Strolin, Co-Chair
High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee
Enclosure
Comments of the High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee
of the Western Interstate Energy Board
on
Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Fabrication and Deployment of a Multi-Purpose Canister-Based System for the Management of Civilian Spent Nuclear Fuel
The following comments on the scoping of the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) environmental impact statement are offered by the High-Level Radioactive Waste Committee of the Western Interstate Energy Board. The comments are organized into four areas:
I. The process for developing the EIS;
II. The interrelationship between the MPC EIS and future EISs for Yucca Mountain and/or an MRS(s);
III. A suggested analytical framework for the EIS; and
IV. Detailed comments on transportation issues.
I. Process
The Department of Energy's (DOE) proposed decision for the fabrication and deployment of a Multi-Purpose Canister-Based System (MPC) for the management of civilian spent nuclear fuel is an enormous agency undertaking. The MPC system is estimated to cost over $5 billion. Design and fabrication of the MPC system will influence the economic structure of the national nuclear equipment industry for years to come. Use of the MPC system for the storage and transportation of spent fuel will affect electric utility companies, ratepayers, investors, state regulatory agencies, host and transportation corridor communities, local governments, rail carriers, and Indian Nations.
The scoping process for the Notice of Intent, which included only three scoping meetings (in Las Vegas, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.), may not have been adequate to elicit responses from all affected parties.
As DOE moves to the development of the January 6, 1995 Draft EIS, the Committee recommends that DOE commit to holding regional hearings across the country in order to allow for all affected parties to have the opportunity to state their concerns about the Draft MPC EIS. The MPC decision will affect all stages of waste management, including transportation which is of major interest to the Committee.
Within the transportation sector alone, the impacts of implementing an MPC system will be immense. At the very least, two east-west interstate highway corridors and six major east-west railroad corridors will be affected. In addition, over 40 states, hundreds of local governments, and many tribal governments would be affected by spent fuel shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository candidate site.
To ensure the public is cognizant of the impact of decisions which are being made, the Committee recommends that the Draft EIS identify likely highway and rail routes to be used for shipments from the 80 current storage sites to the postulated storage and disposal sites. The attached maps developed by the State of Nevada provide evidence of the breadth of the potential transportation impacts from MPC decisions.
The Committee recommends regional hearings on the Draft EIS. The Committee also recommends inclusion of maps showing likely highway and rail routes in the Draft EIS.
II. Interrelationship Between the MPC EIS and Future EISs for Yucca Mountain and/or an MRS(s)
The Committee has two concerns regarding the interrelationship between the MPC EIS and other future EISs: (1) where in the NEPA process the analysis of transportation of different repository waste streams will occur; and (2) where in the NEPA process DOE will fulfill its commitments to route and mode specific analysis. The decision on whether to develop an MPC is clearly connected to and may circumscribe future NWPA program decisions, such as the choice of transportation modes (e.g., extensive reliance on rail to move MPCs).
From the Notice of Intent, it is the Committee's understanding that the MPC EIS will only deal with commercial spent fuel and not the other waste streams which will be placed in a repository, including: vitrified defense and commercial high-level waste; DOE-owned spent fuel; foreign reactor fuel; various miscellaneous wastes from commercial reactors (e.g., hulls, claddings); and possibly "greater than class C waste." DOE needs to identify where in the NEPA process the impacts of moving such waste to a repository (or interim storage facilities) will be evaluated.
On several past occasions the Department of Energy has committed to conducting route- and mode- specific analysis of the impacts of transportation under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. DOE has not yet met this committment. Over the objection of states and other stakeholders, DOE has to date used generic analyses to evaluate impacts from transportation under the NWPA.
The Committee believes that DOE should conduct route and mode-specific analyses of transportation impacts as part of the MPC EIS and not delay analysis to subsequent NEPA reviews, as proposed in the Notice of Intent (p. 19). This may be the only place during the implementation of the NWPA that the full range of transportation alternatives will be considered. For example, following completion of the MPC EIS, DOE may decide to deploy MPCs and forego truck-based transportation. It is highly unlikely that the Department would then decide to revisit the truck transportation option as part of a Yucca Mountain EIS, or MRS EIS, or separate transportation EIS. Additionally, to the Committee's knowledge, DOE has not made plans to fulfill its commitments by conducting nationwide route- and mode- specific analyses as part of other future EISs. The Committee notes that DOE efforts to develop routing guidance are on a different schedule than the MPC EIS and, in any case, may have limited applicability to NWPA shipments.
The Committee recommends that DOE conduct route- and mode- specific analyses of transportation impacts as part of the MPC EIS. DOE should also spell out the connection between the MPC EIS and subsequent NEPA reviews in its implementation plan for the MPC EIS.
III. A Suggested Analytical Framework for the MPC EIS
The Notice of Intent to prepare the MPC EIS outlined four scenarios for analysis:
1. Preferred action to fabricate and deploy the MPC;
2. No action
3. No action supplemented by the deployment of a high-capacity rail cask; and
4. A system of transportable storage casks.
The Committee believes the four scenarios outlined for analysis are appropriate, but need to be expanded.
The Committee believes that the EIS needs to evaluate the impacts of the scenarios during each of the four stages of waste management:
1. At-reactor storage
2. Use of centralized interim storage facilities
3. Disposal at a repository; and
4. Transportation.
Finally, it is critical that the MPC EIS evaluate a variety of contingencies, including the impact of delay on the costs and benefits under each scenario.
The following matrix illustrates the types of impacts in each of the scenarios that should be evaluated.
Impact to be evaluated Scenario
MPC deployment
No action No action with high capacity rail cask
Transportable storage casks
At-reactor storage
Centralized interim storage facilities
Disposal at repository
Transportation
Contingency analysis
At-Reactor Storage: As proposed by DOE, the EIS should evaluate the impact of each of the four scenarios in terms of packaging and handling of spent nuclear fuel as it is transferred to canisters or casks, canister transfer and loading operations, and storage of spent fuel in canisters and casks at reactor sites. The analysis should also examine impacts of decommissioning, as well as continued reactor operation, and specifically evaluate potential contingencies (e.g., need for emergency removal of fuel from the reactor, need to reopen MPCs for presently unforeseen corrective actions that may be needed after the reactor pool has been decommissioned).
Centralized Interim Storage Facilities: DOE is to be commended for proposing to evaluate multiple potential interim storage facilities in both the East and West. The Committee also believes that DOE should evaluate the impact of the construction of private storage facilities, including an analysis of whether private storage facilities will elect to use the MPC. Such analysis should consider at least three options: one or more private storage facilities and no federally-owned facility; both private and federal storage facilities; and only federal storage facilities.
Disposal at a Repository: As proposed by DOE, the MPC EIS will consider the different impacts from spent fuel handling and disposal at a repository resulting from the four scenarios. The analysis of handling impacts should include impacts from reopening the canisters at the repository.
Transportation: Section IV of our comments offers detailed comments on the content of the transportation analysis that should be part of the MPC EIS.
Contingency Analysis: Changing program plans and delay have been the hallmark of the NWPA. Indeed, it is not clear that the schedule outlined for the development of MPCs is realistic. Numerous groups, including the Committee, have urged DOE to include contingency analyses in the Department's efforts to implement the Act. The Committee believes that the MPC EIS should include a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the costs and benefits of the alternatives given potential delays in key assumptions. In particular, the Committee believes that DOE needs to evaluate the costs and benefits of an MPC if the development and deployment of the MPC is delayed by 5 and 10 years beyond the target date. The Committee also believes that DOE should evaluate the contingency wherein DOE develops the MPC, but utilities do not accept its use and elect to employ other storage technologies.
IV. Detailed Discussion of Transportation Analysis in the MPC EIS
The Committee believes that it is not possible to conduct a meaningful assessment of transportation risk analysis and risk management in the MPC EIS until several underlying programmatic and policy assumptions are made explicit. For example, the MPC EIS should identify DOE's assumptions regarding:
Full-scale cask testing;
Routing policy, particularly as it applies to rail shipments;
Use of dedicated trains;
Use of contract carriers;
Implementation of Section 180(c) assistance; and
Use of shipment escorts.
In addition to making underlying programmatic and policy assumptions explicit, the Committee recommends that the MPC EIS should address the following:
The impact on the integrity of the spent fuel and/or canister during transportation following extended storage.
The degree to which heavy-haul truck shipments will be used at reactor. The impact on the system if there is no rail access to MRS or repository sites.
The train configuration DOE is assuming (e.g., single cask cars on general freight trains, dedicated trains of specific length).
The expected radiological exposures to, and potential health impacts on, members of the general public and workers of using dedicated trains as opposed to general freight service for rail shipment of MPCs.
The potential radiological impacts on members of the general public from truck shipments of spent fuel using the GA 4/9 casks. The analysis should specifically include potential exposures to members of the public resulting from non-accident situations including truck refueling at truck stops, slow and/or stop-and-go traffic in road construction zones, and so-called "gridlock" incidents (up to 4 hours duration) resulting from traffic congestion, bad weather, accidents involving other vehicles, or other causes.
The full range of potential health and safety implications of using lightweight, cab-over-engine tractors to haul GA 4/9 casks under current legal weight limits. This analysis should include, for example, potentially increased probability of accidents resulting from human factors (such as accelerated fatigue) and the potential for increased physical security and safeguards concerns resulting from operational factors (such as more frequent refueling stops due to weight-constrained fuel tank capacity).
The potential costs and benefits of including a requirement for continuous, real-time monitoring of shipping cask internal conditions as part of the MPC design and the GA 4/9 design.
A detailed discussion of management strategies for maintaining routine radiological exposures throughout the waste management system as low as reasonably achievable (the ALARA concept).
In addition to addressing "accidents with low probability but high consequences" the EIS should also address the potential effects of natural disasters (especially earthquakes and floods), catastrophic infrastructure failures, and sabotage or terrorist attack during handling, storage, and transportation.
The EIS should include a separate consequence analysis for maximum severe transportation accidents involving a 125-ton MPC, a 75-ton MPC, and a GA 4/9 truck cask. For each hypothetical accident scenario, the EIS should provide a detailed description of the relevant assumptions, such as impact speed, fire duration and temperature, proximity to highly populated areas, weather conditions, time required for emergency response, cask performance (loss of shielding and/or containment), and radiological consequences. The EIS should also provide a sensitivity scenario explaining where key assumptions are based on expert judgement and/or limited data and explaining how the calculated radiological consequences would be affected by different assumptions.
The EIS should address the potential economic impacts of transportation accidents. For accidents which do not involve loss of shielding and/or containment, the EIS should evaluate potential emergency response costs and liabilities for rail carriers, motor carriers, state governments, local governments, Tribal governments, and U.S. DOE. For accidents involving loss of shielding and/or containment, the EIS should evaluate cleanup and disposal costs in addition to emergency response costs. The EIS should also address potential adverse economic impacts resulting from perceived risk of spent fuel transportation.