What Do We Know About Demand Reduction Programs: Is There a Best Practice?

Prepared for the Western Interstate Energy Board Meeting

October 29, 2001

Seattle, WA Todd Davis, SAIC

William King, SAIC

 

Summary

 

This paper presents the rationale supporting the use of demand reduction and real time pricing (RTP) programs.  A summary of prior experiences with these programs is provided.  The paper presents best practices of these programs.  An argument is made for linking demand response and real time prices to state energy master plans and market conditions and communicating to customers and energy sales and marketing personnel the role and rationale of these programs. Recommendations are provided for creating a Western region demand bidding and real time pricing market under certain conditions.  State energy master plans would focus on the state’s energy supply chain, infrastructure, strengths/weaknesses/opportunities, key risks and demand profile.  This could help avoid some surprises similar to what California experienced this past summer.  As states move into more uncharted seas of deregulation and market dynamics such plans would not only be timely but also save a tremendous amount of money and help keep local utilities financially viable.

 

Background:  The Rationale For Demand Reduction Programs

 

Demand reduction programs are usually event driven programs that occur when power prices either hit a certain cost threshold or reserve margins drop below a minimum percent – usually 8% or less of available peak load.  These programs are usually of two types:  predefined economic or emergency demand reduction programs where a specified price is paid for guaranteed load reduction independent of day ahead market prices; or flexible load reduction programs where bid prices are tied to day ahead spot prices of power.  These latter programs are more voluntary and customers can determine whether or not they want to participate.  The former program also frequently offers a firm capacity payment and the latter is sometimes a lower incentive. 

 

EPRI estimated that demand response programs have the potential of reducing 45,000 MW’s of capacity, or 6.4% of baseline usage.[1]  EPRI has also estimated that demand reduction programs can save anywhere from 4,800 MW to 9,000 MW’s of load, depending on the scenario.

 

The events of this past summer showed that in California as much as 13% of demand could be provided met by conservation and demand reduction programs.  A significant percent of this is met by flexible demand reduction measures - 7% of CAISO load.  This past summer the New York Pool obtained as much as 400 MW’s on selected peak load days through demand reduction programs.  Utilities in the Pacific Northwest saw as much as 1000 MW’s bid by customers for an average price of less than $100/kW.  At certain periods this past summer, this was a less costly way to buy capacity than to by power in a highly volatile day ahead market where prices went higher than $400/kW.  However, there may be periods where day ahead prices fall below $60/MWh and the need for demand reduction may be less important from a strict economic perspective.  The attractiveness of demand reduction programs is that you use them only during periods of energy or capacity need.  You can set up these programs during periods of energy or capacity shortfalls.  It is not uncommon to offer as many as three programs in one market area – with each program designed in a way that addresses the capacity or energy problem.  Prior experience shows that different types of customers will respond to different types of demand bidding programs.

 

There are many benefits of interruptible and demand bidding programs for buyers of load, sellers of load, regional power agencies and states that are active in demand reduction programs.  Generally speaking, interruptible programs and demand bidding, in particular, are a “call option” whereby buyers in a market that may need temporary capacity pay a nominal fee to have access to load when it is needed.  Given the growing volatility in wholesale markets, the boom and bust cycle for power development, and the greater uncertainty of guaranteed supply and the need for a suitable reserve that can be called upon during emergencies, interruptible and demand bidding programs are expected to be around for some time.  These programs are a win/win for buyers and sellers. 

 

For buyers of demand reduction load namely the states and utilities that need (this sentence is unreadable in present format) capacity, they may acquire this load at a price that is less than the day ahead market and even avert curtailments which may be more costly.  

Demand reduction programs are an efficient means of transferring demand from customers who are more flexible or willing to reduce their coincident demand and sell it to markets that need it the most.  This is an efficient market clearing mechanism. 

 

Sellers include end-use customers, aggregators, and wholesale suppliers who benefit by adding diversity, reliability and higher margin producing possibilities to their sales opportunities.  This past summer showed examples where BPA “acquired” additional energy from a major Aluminum Company including the wages of employees because of the need to avoid expensive day ahead power and the chance that load could not be met.  This was when no other sources were readily available to avert curtailments.  On the other hand Portland General Electric (PGE) saw demand reduction programs as an opportunity to sell available capacity in the California market and use the higher margins from these sales as a means to reduce scheduled rate increases for local customers.  This contrasts with other Northwest utilities that used demand reduction as a means to save on purchased power costs.  Later the FERC price caps somewhat limited the opportunity by imposing limits to the superheated day-ahead spot market and this limited the very high returns to demand bidding.

 

 In California and New York, there are also third party aggregators that are seeking interruptible loads and selling these loads to regional power organizations like the New York Pool, which have programs to purchase interruptible loads during certain occasions.   Also, energy marketers like to use these programs as opportunities to create marketing and cross sale opportunities where a portion of the capacity payment is invested in additional cost saving diagnostics and opportunities – like metering and bill tracking and verification services.

 

To summarize, demand reduction programs are a win/win for buyers and sellers.  They create less costly demand and energy supply, increase reliability, and are only used when the market needs the resource.  The Western states would benefit from carefully designed demand reduction programs both within states and across states to help improve transmission flow and capacity and influence price stability. This may include both energy and capacity programs that are either day ahead and longer term where capacity payments occur to insure that some reserves exist to meet potential zone constraints.  Also, these programs may be designed to appeal to different types of customers.  However, great care must be taken to not design too many programs because this can be too confusing to customers and inhibit participation.  

 

Objectives of Paper

 

The objectives of this paper are to:

  1. Review the current state of interruptible and demand bidding programs and identify the magnitude of response by customers in such programs
  2. Define lessons of experience and recommendations for developing demand-bidding programs
  3. Recommend an approach for the Western states to consider interruptible and demand bidding and real time pricing programs.

 

The Current State of Interruptible and Demand Reduction Programs and Alternative Program Designs

 

There are generally two types of interruptible programs:  passive price programs and demand bidding programs.  Passive price programs define in advance the requirements for the customer to qualify, what the minimum loads are that can be interrupted and what the price is for the interruption.  These programs are less flexible in responding to market price dynamics than other programs.  The other type of program is a demand bidding or exchange program where customers participate in a day ahead market and bid a certain amount of load at a given price.  The buyer may or may not take the bid.

 

Demand reduction bid prices range from $100-500 on average.  Typical loads that are available to aggregators are from 100-400 MW’s of load.  Market data from some organizations indicated that about 2/3’s of the load from any entity aggregating demand could be acquired at about $100/kW.  Both BPA and other Northwest utilities have found that a substantial amount of load is possible even at prices slightly below $100/kW. Demand bidding programs were offered by utilities in the Northwest, California, New England, New York state and utilities who are members of PJM – a longstanding regional power pool serving Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland.

 

Examples are provided below.

 

New York ISO Has Three Types of Interruptible Programs

 

The three programs that the NY ISO offered this past summer are the following:

 

ü       A Special Case Resources Program called ICAP for interruptible capacity where a customer gets paid up front to shed a defined MW load.  If customers are not able to deliver the pledged load they must buy the energy back at a premium.

ü       Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) - Voluntary.  If the customer can shut down the load in time to meet system requirements, payment is made.  No payment or penalty if customer does not.

ü       Day Ahead Demand Response Program - Twenty-four hours in advance, customer indicates amount of load available for reduction.  NYISO accepts all or a portion of the bid load at least cost for a specific time period and pays the customer ahead for committing to the accepted amount.  The payment is the day-ahead price of the savings (greater of market price or $500/MW).  Effectively, the customer is treated as a generation resource and must pay a ten percent penalty if the curtailment is not delivered upon request, in addition to paying the greater of the day-ahead or real time cost of the agreed curtailment amount.

 

Program Process - Twenty-four hours prior to an expected load curtailment event, the NYISO Customer Relations department sends e-mails to customers requesting bids.  Customers and load aggregators often reply.  There is no set reduction amount; bids range anywhere from 1 MW up.  On the day of curtailment, NYISO issues a curtailment warning two hours prior to the event.  The program is marketed by load serving entities (LSEs), ESCOs, and load aggregators. 

 

Program Results - As of August 2001, EDRP had 23 participants, representing 611 MW load reduction capability.  This amount includes 467 MW interruptible loads, 107 MW on-site generation, and 37 MW combined interruptible load and on-site generation.  From August 6-10, available interruptible loads ranged from 406-476 MW’s. On average on peak days 50% and more bids were accepted.  During the highest days nearly all the bids were accepted.  For the Day head Demand Response Program from 20-40 MW’s was accepted on average for the highest peak days.  Curtailment aggregators must provide at least 100kW in load in a single zone. A payment of the higher of $500/MWh or the RT Zonal LBMP or locational marginal price /MWh for verified reductions in load. 

 

Program Experience – The EDRP program was activated four times during Summer 2001 (August 7 through 9).  Load aggregators bring most of the load reduction bids to the NYISO.  The curtailment events went smoothly.  For instance, the EDRP program worked smoothly on August 7 and 8, 2001, with preliminary estimates of 400 MW demand reduction over the two days.  About 90% of the data for these events has been analyzed and results remain close to the estimated curtailment amount.  A level of 95% compliance was observed.  Communications with customers was not an issue, even with load aggregators, who represented many of the customers.

 

Note: New York State loads on the curtailment days were at all-time highs: August 7, 2001 (30,509 MW) and August 8, 2001 (30,665 MW). [2]

 

PJM Has Two Programs (Eastern PA, New Jersey and Maryland)

 

The PJM Load Response Program includes two options: Emergency Load Response Program and Economic Load Response Program.  These are somewhat similar to the NY Pool demand response programs.  Customers must reduce at least 100 kW in load.  A minimum of ten hours of interruption is required and must be able to participate between 9AM and 10 PM during any and all days in the week.   Customers must also pay the $5,000 membership fee to join PJM.  Notification must be received electronically. Interval hourly meters are required. The higher amount of the zonal marginal price or $500/MWh will be paid. 

 

PGE’s Demand Buyback Program (Oregon)

 

PGE offers a voluntary buyback program to customers where customers may receive anywhere from $.10-.45/kWh depending on market prices for load that is curtailed.  The program is initiatived during peak periods when electric prices are at their highest.  Advanced notice of 12 hours and up to two days occurs.  Load interruptions may last from a few hours to up to 24 hours.  Customers can pick the duration and load amounts interrupted.  An easy interactive web page is used to receive bids, track participation and account status.

 

California’s Large Portfolio of Interruptible Programs

 

The state of California has perhaps the most exhaustive array of demand reduction programs.  These programs coupled with other conservation programs resulted in approximately 8,000 MW’s reduced from the State’s Total Load requirements of 61,000 MW’s (13%).  The interruptible programs are estimated to represent about 3,000 MW’s of the 8,000 MW’s of load reduction.  The main programs offered include:

 

ü       Base Interruptible Program

ü       Optional Binding Mandatory Curtailment Program

ü       Voluntary Demand Reduction Programs

ü       Non-firm Interruptible programs

ü       Demand Bidding program.

 

A summary of these programs as implemented by PG&E appears in Attachment A.  In early July the state created a demand bidding program.  However, while customers have signed up for the program and one utility has about 300 MW’s it could bid in the program, the Department of Water Resources (DWR) is not taking bids because day ahead spot prices of power are lower than what most customers may be willing to bid in load at.  One utility showed over two-thirds of customers willing to bid load at between $75 and $100/MWh.  Attachment B shows which of these programs may be most appealing to certain types of customers.

 

Currently the state is considering ways to improve the performance of these programs and even possibly consolidate the number of programs that exist.  Actual load reported as of the first week of July is 188 MW for the VDRP program, 88 MW for the CEC Demand Responsiveness Program, 38 MW for the OBMC program and 1 MW for the Baseload Interruptible program.

 

What Works and Doesn’t Work

 

What Doesn’t Work?

 

  1. Excessive advanced up front customer investment expense – like heavy testing and certification of equipment
  2. Creating programs and not buying load – this undermines credibility for all programs.  Better to design up front some capacity payment or advanced notification so that some customers can plan ahead when loads may be interrupted. 
  3. Price disclosure if you are the seller. Buyers do not like to have a transparent demand bidding market even though customers do related what they are selling the load for to what wholesale prices are pegged at.  There is concern on the part of the buyers that some holding back will occur during peak periods to extract as much economic value on the bid load as possible.
  4. Longer term settlement provisions tend to make program benefits invisible
  5. Excessively complicated programs
  6. Too many programs – avoid having more than three programs
  7. Limiting participation to only utilities – need to allow market aggregators to participate.  In New York, utility distribution companies competed against their own unregulated business units and with other third party aggregators.  A buyer’s market was created.
  8. Manually processed bids – there is sometimes a temptation to use simpler spreadsheet transaction support tools when more flexible and tailored demand reduction tools are available.  Silicon Energy, Apogee, PowerWeb and ApX are companies that offer tailored tools to support demand bidding programs with various features and price ranges.

 

What Works?

 

  1. Keep the number of programs and options to a few – no more than three programs
  2. Offering a range of bid prices from very low to high
  3. Fixing prices in each bid block
  4. Minimum load bids
  5. Aggregation and use of third parties
  6. Using both market based and/or predefined bid estimates with tailored to demand and/or energy
  7. Price disclosure if you are the buyer
  8. Large number of tiers and limited number of hours in tiers.  Using a good software tool to support this program design is important
  9. Verification and penalties – ranges of sampling to 100% verification are used.  Penalties for not yielding the bid load can be up to three times the bid price.  Idaho just experienced the situation where the utility thought the contracted penalties would not be upheld in court---because market prices were so low that the liquidated damage provision seemed confiscatory.  They asked for 30 cents per kWh [2X the bid price] when the market price was only about 3 cents).  This suggests that demand bid programs must manage expectations in terms of when the programs are likely to be used.  This is why offering a range of programs requiring certain levels of flexibility, payments and penalties is good.
  10. Short-term settlement versus longer-term settlement.  This allows customers to know what they are getting and this can stimulate additional participation.  Shorter settlement periods are potential differentiators are energy service marketers.
  11. Using lottery and rotation system for selecting bids
  12. Web support transaction tools
  13. Compliance testing
  14. Metering incentives
  15. Compliance with emission laws
  16. Limiting number of bid days
  17. Advance notice
  18. Simplicity in program design
  19. Programs embodying locational T&D incentives and credits in addition to generation offsets
  20. Account executives are key to marketing the program.  They have to believe that the program creates value for customers and their utility.  It is very important to have customer and sales person education and training to support the programs.  Training must include differentiating each program to meet specific customer needs.
  21. Detailed sales and marketing plans are needed.  Often program impacts were retarded due to a lack of organized marketing initiatives to promote the programs.  It took a crisis to get awareness, attention and response for many programs.

 

Recommendations:  Incorporating Better Design Features in Interruptible and Demand Bidding Programs

 

It is difficult to recommend a particular demand bidding program without the participation of various stakeholder groups.  One program design does not necessarily apply to all customers.  Customers vary in their tolerance of frequency and duration of interruptions.  Both passive price programs (do you mean “programs” here?) and market-based demand bids can be used simultaneously in two different programs. 

 

Based on available experience, to date, recommended program considerations include the following:

 

  1. Program Objectives
    1. Be clear on the objectives of the program – capacity deferral or energy supply.  If you have a need for both – different program designs are needed.
    2. If programs are tailored to reliability that appeal to diverse customers and markets or zones, then multiple programs may be needed, or multiple prices or bids allowed.

 

  1. Program Development Strategy
    1. Timing – it does not take more than a few weeks to develop a demand bidding program.  Insuring that backup systems are in place and have been tested may take 3-6 weeks.
    2. Use a cross section of utility, third party marketers, ISO and other stakeholders to define the goals and help develop the program. This may include various customer groups and business associations.
    3. Critical to insure that regulatory bodies and organization “buying” the load is involved and have as much interest in designing program and then following through with implementation.
    4. In the simplest form, demand bidding programs are rate or tariff programs.  This can make program design and approval simpler.
  2. Program Design and Pricing
    1. Much of the available interruptible load – the lion’s share – can be obtained at prices of $100 and less.  Offer a broader range of price tiers – no more than two or three and yet create an opportunity for a large range of prices – from low, to medium and high price tiers.
    2. Consider minimum load requirements from customers and aggregators – this encourages efficiency in program performance.
    3. Third party marketers and energy service companies should be encouraged to participate subject to whether or not the state has retail choice.  If not, the program can be promoted by local utility distribution companies, ISO’s, and regional power pools.
    4. Price disclosure of bids should be considered. If a real time price program is created in addition to a demand bid program, then customers will use this as a proxy for bidding interruptible load in the market.
    5. Use more dynamic market pricing versus static pricing unless a minimum of demand reduction is needed over a limited time period.  Provide for a range of bid prices within hourly segments.
    6. Require some form of pre-implementation and testing before launch.
    7. Try to encourage shorter term settlement provisions – if possible daily settlement.
    8. Create a web based transaction and program support capability.
    9. Consider offering advanced notice of bid requests.
    10. Consider locational pricing and incentives taking into account T&D constraints.
    11. Require customer acceptance of spot meter verification.
    12. Minimum time block bids of three hours should be considered.
    13. Keep the number of agencies and sponsors of a program to a few.  (That is state authorities).  If multiple actors are involved this confuses customers and creates drift and programs and policies that work at cross purposes.
  3. Marketing and Sales
    1. How the demand bidding program fits within overall state policy needs to be articulated especially when new capacity and demand bidding are encouraged simultaneously.
    2. Need to link program incentives and use to wholesale market price dynamics – need to explain to customers how program use is tied to forward price.
    3. Need to communicate to customers how different programs may benefit or not benefit certain businesses and loads.
    4. Additional incentives should be considered like free interval meters and other creative marketing approaches to gain customer acceptance.  Utilities serving smaller markets can sometimes get by with smaller incentives and marketing expense.
    5. Develop a well thought out sales and marketing plan.  Be sure to follow through with the program and not let it just sit on the shelf unless there are good reasons and these are communicated to customers.
    6. Conduct training and create sufficient program support tools – these are often lacking and contribute to limiting program effectiveness.
  4. Use of Tools
    1. Use tools that support daily settlement
    2. Create an internet based transaction capability
    3. Fit the tool to the current and future growth requirements.  Many tools exist in different price and scalability ranges.
  5. Program Costs
    1. Administrative and marketing costs for demand bidding programs, depending on the size and market area, are usually about three percent of total program cost – or for most programs may average about $200,000 – 400,000 per year.  Some first time cost for the IT system may be as much as $200,000-4000,000 of first cost.  How these costs are treated vary.

 

Metering and Time Differentiated Pricing

 

A major cause of the electric supply crisis in California was the more static retail prices while wholesale prices skyrocketed and became quite volatile.  Other contributors were buying too much power in the day ahead market and no long term hedge on electric prices.  California demonstrated that demand response programs and conservation could be a big hedge to balance supply and demand.  Also, given that states now will have to contend with more uncertainty in supply and that there will always be some capacity that is not definite, stronger vigilance will be needed by state regulatory bodies to:

 

  1. Insure adequate state reserve margins
  2. Track new construction and maintenance cycles
  3. Create flexible and interruptible load strategies
  4. Offer retail prices that track wholesale prices
  5. Insure that adequate metering exists to support more dynamic and time differentiated pricing
  6. Encourage more distributed resources
  7. Balance environmental quality with emergency supply situations
  8. Create contingency plans that balance short- and long-term issues and opportunities.

 

State level energy master or contingency plans are needed to recognize that energy policies and success to date in promoting competitive markets has not progressed as much as expected.  Meanwhile the great trends of energy security, environmental protection, technology development, and increasing customer and stakeholder collaborative business processes requires that states and regions get their arms around these fundamental trends and find their complimentary place. Encouraging demand bidding, real time pricing and other time differentiated programs should be a part of state tactical and strategic energy planning.  The California PUC is considering provisions for customers having an interval meter must be on some demand reduction program, real time pricing or time of use pricing.  States also at a strategic level need to find their niche in the West in terms of being a supplier, transporter or modifier of end use energy and technology.  Such plans are needed to realize opportunities and limit risks in a much more uncertain energy sea.  Supply and demand initiatives though more highly market driven, need to have contingencies and the states need to be aggressive in evaluating what they should be.  In the future, as much as 10-15 % of load may be at risk and so adequate precautions are needed to take this into account in terms of considering tactical and longer term planning.  Such plans should be developed not only from state perspectives but also the context of being in a broader regional market, including markets involving Canada and Mexico.  States need to be sure that their demand reduction programs are more closely tied to market dynamics and that there are suitable contingencies to respond to market fluctuations that run contrary to the public interest.  California is a very good lesson of experience here for the need of such plans. 

 

Real Time Pricing

 

An important way to encourage more distributed resources is to encourage demand bidding and real time pricing programs.  This will accelerate balancing supply and demand.  The highest form of load optimization and market price balancing is real time pricing. While this form of pricing has been experimental for some time, it is starting to grow in greater use in the year’s ahead.

 

The largest real time pricing program is the Georgia Power Company Real Time Pricing Program.  Currently, there are 1600 customers with loads of over 250kW.  There has been an over 400-800 MW response, which is equivalent to 2.5 – 5.0 % of GPC system load. 

 

Another innovative program is the one involving Puget Sound Energy customers which uses smart meters and Internet-based technologies that give customers nearly real time information on the variable, time sensitive cost of energy.[3]  Real time pricing programs are heavily dependent upon time sensitive energy costs and consumption.  Right now most customers rely on very static information or lack of information in making energy consumption decisions.  Programs similar to Puget’s should help customers react in more real time, dynamic ways to market prices and their own immediate needs. Puget Energy now supplies real time customer data to about 400,000 customers. Using Puget’s web site customer can talk to a customer service representative to get advice on how to balance loads with energy prices. Recent Puget surveys have indicated that over 79% of residential customers and 70% of business customers have taken action to alter their energy use.  About 43% of residential customers have taken action to shift electric use to off peak periods. And 41 % have cut their use during peak periods. A trial of 300,000 households is now occurring through September and there are plans to offer universal real time pricing programs to all of Puget’s customers.

 

A recent report by McKinsey Company found that Americans could save $15 billion annually with real time pricing.[4]  A report by EPRI found that California customers could have reduced the state’s peak demand by 2.5 % during the Summer 2000 period and cut electric bills by $700 million.  RTP benefits occur primarily during periods of lowering consumption during higher price periods.  Usually the amount of energy or load shifted is far less than the impact on market prices – which may be as much as five times greater impact, depending on the market.

 

The experience to date is that customers will respond to prices based on their needs, knowledge of how to modify loads and perceived economic value.  Customers will invest in a variety of new demand side products and solutions.  Price responses of customers are often creative.  Large C/I customers clearly have economies of scale.[5]

 

The key success factors of RTP are:

 

  1. Using an efficient pricing model that is truly win-win – one that offers a pricing structure that benefits both the utility, customer and larger market dynamics
  2. Customer education
  3. Customer access to load and price data and advisory information
  4. Timely, accurate and informative bills
  5. Stable rate environment vs. prices
  6. Successful case histories are reported
  7. Use pilot programs
  8. Offer other rate incentives for customers who cannot participate in real time pricing like time of use pricing
  9. RTP and TOU pricing do fit in either a regulated or competitive market model.  These pricing programs will also drive some customers to purchase hedge or fixed pricing products or prices with caps or collars.

 

 

Conclusion:  Creating a Western States Interruptible Demand Bidding and Real Time Pricing Programs

 

Given the prior experience of other sponsors of demand bidding and real time pricing programs, and considering the unique aspects of the Western power market, and size of the retail market for states outside of California, there is a need for the Western states to consider the following:

  1. States should create master plans that involve strategic directions of five years or more and tactical or contingency plans for positioning states in more uncertain energy seas
  2. These plans need to include interruptible, pricing, supply, transmission, and retail energy components
  3. State plans need to include regional dimensions and local constraints and perspectives
  4. Emergency contingencies should also be included
  5. The roles of key agencies should be defined
  6. Key policies and programs should be defined to manage the energy supply and demand chain and insure that it is close to market dynamics
  7. Such policies need to embrace accelerating real time metering and billing technology, distributed automation, real time prices, and periodic energy and capacity constraints
  8. A two tiered market should be considered for the Western states – one that involves a within state real time price and demand reduction incentives and a second tier that encourages bi-lateral markets to send load into other states or markets if reserves fall below a certain percent – or if ratepayers in both states benefit – creating flexible provisions for bi-lateral demand reduction programs – in some states these programs can occur now as what occurred between Oregon and California through the local utilities
    1. State laws, FERC provisions and tariff issues need to be evaluated
  9. A collaborative framework and clear policies and programs are needed and communicated to all stakeholders and most importantly to customers so that they understand the rationale for the programs and how they fit prevailing energy market conditions and the direction of state energy policy.  Not making this clear will create even more friction in the energy market.

 

 

SAIC has substantial experience in designing, implementing and managing interruptible and demand response programs.  We have participated in the design of such programs in the Middle Atlantic region and in the West.  SAIC staff has been involved in front office, mid office and back office support roles.  We have also developed sales and marketing programs for these programs.  SAIC is prepared to assist WGA in evaluating; planning and implementing demand response, RTP and other price and demand responsive programs for the WSCC and Western states.  Please contact Mr. Todd Davis for more information. Todd.d.davis@saic.com


Attachment A


 

 



Attachment B

 

Customers Guide to Programs

 

 

If your primary concern is:                                                   Select

·         Reliability                                                                           OBMC

·         Guaranteed minimum savings ($/kw-yr)                             Interruptible, ISO DRP

·         Fixed $/kWh savings                                                          UDC VDRP, ISO DRP, ISO DLCP

·         Maximum # reductions                                                       Interruptible, ISO DRP

·         No minimum load reduction                                                RTP

·         No new interval metering                                                   ISO DLCP

·         Daily savings opportunities                                                RTP

·         Day ahead notice                                                              RTP, ISO DLCP

·         Month ahead notice                                                           UDC SLRP

·         No penalty if do not reduce demand                                  RTP, TOU, ISO DLPC?

·         Protection of load growth from market prices                     Any but RTP

·         May buy incremental power below tariff rate                      RTP

·         Complements to OBMC/Interruptible                                  RTP

 



[1].  EPRI, “Closing the Electricity Infrastructure Gap – Can We Avert a Crisis”. EPRI Advisory Council and Board of Directors:  Summer Seminar 2000” (August 5-7, 2001), p. 22.

[2].  Additional information on experience/results of August curtailment events: See NYISO website, Services - Board of Directors, Committees and Working Groups - Business Issues Committee - Price-Response Load Working Group - Meeting Materials - Meeting Materials for Sept. 14 meeting - Agenda Items 2 and 8

 

[3] “The Imperative for Real Time Pricing.” Utility Business (September 2001), 36-38.

[4] Ibid.

[5].  SCT, “Implementation of California RTP Supplemental Tariff”. Presented to CEC in July, 2001.